Jurisdiction--Libel--First Amendment\u27s Role in Determining Place of Trial in Libel Actions by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 3 
1968 
Jurisdiction--Libel--First Amendment's Role in Determining Place 
of Trial in Libel Actions 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and 
the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Jurisdiction--Libel--First Amendment's Role in Determining Place of Trial in Libel 
Actions, 66 MICH. L. REV. 542 (1968). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol66/iss3/9 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
542 Michigan Law Review [VoL 66 
JURISDICTION-LIBEL-First Amendment's Role in 
Determining Place of Trial in Libel Actions 
State and federal courts have often displayed a reluctance to 
entertain libel suits against newspapers when jurisdiction over the 
defendant is based solely upon the distribution of a small number 
of newspapers within the forum state.1 Undoubtedly, one of the rea-
sons for this hesitation is the mischief that can be worked by a simul-
taneous, literal application of the rules of libel and the rules of 
jurisdiction, A common view of libel places the tort at the point of 
"publication," that is, at the point of communication to third parties.2 
Moreover, most states have now enacted statutes which provide that 
the commission of a single tort within the state is sufficient to justify 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the state over the tortfeasor.3 When 
1. E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley 
v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964); Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 
(5th Cir. 1964); Walker v. Field Enterprises, 332 F.2d 632 (10th Cir. 1964); Perna v. 
Dell Publishing Co., 240 F. Supp. 268 (D. Mass. 1964); Breckenridge v. Time, Inc., 
253 Miss. 835, 179 S.2d 781 (1965). On the other hand, there are cases in which 
jurisdiction was exercised despite the defendant's protests that circulation of his 
publication within the forum state was too small. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 
F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966) ("wide circulation"-no figures): Origoni v, Bulletin Co., 
258 F, Supp. 359 (D.D.C, 1966), 
2. This rule originated in Duke v. Harmer, 117 Eng, Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849), found in 
RJ!:sTATEMENT OF nm LMV OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377, n.5, at 357 (1934). 
3. E,g., !LL. Rzy, STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1965); .ret: Elkhart Epg'r Corp. v. Dornier 
Werke, 3¾3 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965) •. 
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the two rules are combined, they interact to make the publisher who 
mails a single copy of his newspaper into a state the potential defen-
dant of a libel suit in that state, regardless of the distance between 
the forum and the publisher's business and editorial offices or his 
place of publishing.a! 
The seeming unfairness of basing jurisdiction solely on such or-
dinarily inconsequential acts as mailing a newspaper into another 
state has troubled some courts.5 Traditionally, the validity of such 
a jurisdictional basis would be judged against the fourteenth amend-
ment standard of "fair play."6 In several recent cases, however, courts 
have brought to bear constitutional standards of free speech as well as 
of fairness in dealing with the problem of jurisdiction over the out-
of-state defendant in a libel action. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, in deciding New York Times Go. v. Connor, ruled that 
"First Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel re-
quire a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause 
than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious 
activity."7 Shortly after this pronouncement the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, in New York Post v. Buckley,8 rejected the 
Connor position and proposed instead that first amendment consid-
erations be handled through the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
In a third case, Curtis Publishing Go. v. Golino,9 the Fifth Circuit, 
which had decided Cottnor, declared that jurisdiction might be 
acquired more easily where the defendant is a national magazine 
rather than a newspaper.10 This Note attempts an analysis of the 
rules formulated in these cases and the criticism and commentary, 
both judicial and academic, which have been directed at them. 
I. THE CASES 
Connor involved a newspaper article on racial tensions in Bir-
mingham, Alabama, which criticized the plaintiff as well as the gen-
eral community. Jurisdiction was based upon the publication of the 
alleged libel within the state: approximately 395 copies of the New 
York Times were mailed daily (2,455 on the weekend) into Alabama 
at that time. The rule formulated by the Connor court, requiring 
4. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966), is illustrative 
of the problem involved although in this instance the court found that it was without 
jurisdiction. 
5. E.g., .Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470, 475 {5th Cir. 1964) ("Such is 
not enough to make it reasonable and just ... for the State of Louisiana to enforce 
against them the obligations arising out of such activities"). 
6. lntcmational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
7. 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1964). 
8. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967). 
9. 38!1 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). 
10. The Conner and Golino opinions were both written by Judge Thornberry. The 
other two members of the court were not the same on these two occasions. 
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a "greater showing of contact," was designed to protect publishers 
with minimal circulation in a state from the disproportionate risks 
of bias-inflated jury verdicts.11 The court felt that such protection 
was necessary not so much for the publisher's sake as for the preser-
vation of vital interests of the people of the state, since the publisher 
would be likely to cease distribution of his publication in any state 
"where the size of circulation does not balance the danger of this 
liability. "12 
Buckley involved neither small circulation nor inflammatory 
racial issues. Mail circulation of the New York Post in Connecticut, 
where suit was brought, was placed at an average of I, 707 copies daily. 
The precise number of copies "tucked each day under the arms of 
commuters" was unknown, but the court indicated its belief that the 
number was quite substantial.13 The distances between the defendant 
and the forum were also very different in Connor and Buckley: in 
the former the New York Times was summoned from New York to 
Alabama; in the latter the New York Post 1vas summoned from New 
York to Fairfield County, Connecticut, only forty miles from New 
York City.14 The Buckley court considered the Connor precedent 
and rejected it, both in application to the facts of the Buckley case 
and in principle. In place of the Connor rule a modified doctrine 
was suggested: "the First Amendment could be regarded as giving 
forum non conveniens special dimensions and constitutional stature 
• • • • "
15 Even as modified, however, the doctrine was of no avail 
to the New York Post. Lack of substantial inconvenience and of 
regional or racial prejudice ruled out any application of the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens. 
The Golino case involved a magazine rather than a newspaper. 
The article containing the alleged libel discussed organized crime. 
Circulation of the defendant's publication, the Saturday Evening 
Post, consisted of 5,000 to 6,000 newsstand sales and 54,000 to 55,000 
subscription copies each week. Judge Thornberry, author of both the 
Golino and Connor decisions, distinguished Connor on the basis of 
circulation and the nature of the publication. With respect to the 
latter the court said: 
The existence of a newspaper, no matter how popular, depends 
primarily upon circulation in the vicinity of its publication. Circu-
lation in other areas may well be welcomed, but it is not critical to 
11. 365 F.2d at 572. 
12. Id. For a recent discussion of the general problems of long-arm jurisdiction 
over out-of-state publishers, see Note, Can the "Long-Arm" Reach Out-of-State 
Publishers?, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 83 (1967). 
13. 373 F.2d at 184. 
14. Suit was brought in the state court, but the case was removed to the federal 
court. 
15. 373 F.2d at 183-84. 
January 1968] Notes 545 
the newspaper's continued existence .... Such is not the case with 
a publisher of a national magazine. The primary function of such a 
business is to sell as many magazines as possible in every state of the 
union, and to that end the corporation actively directs its business.16 
II. CRITICISMS OF CONNOR 
The Buckley court was not the only source of criticism of Connor. 
Law review commentary has been almost uniformly unfavorable to 
the incorporation of first amendment principles in questions of 
jurisdiction.17 Four main arguments have been advanced: (I) permit-
ting first amendment policy to affect rules of jurisdiction is a mis-
application of the concept of due process; (2) special protection for 
out-of-state publishers is unfair to defamed plaintiffs; (3) special 
protection for out-of-state publishers is unnecessary; and (4) even if 
special protection is necessary, it is supplied adequately by the rule 
of New York Times v. Sullivan.18 
A. The First Amendment, Rules of Jurisdiction, and Due Process 
The Buckley court expressed its belief that while publishers 
should be accorded various protections by procedural rules, 
such considerations go not to "jurisdiction" over the defendant ... 
but to the consistency with the First Amendment's objectives in a 
certain case. The basis for dismissal [of the libel suit], in other words, 
would not be the minimum contacts requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause as such .... [T]he office served by 
the Fourteenth Amendment would be simply the making of the First 
applicable to the states .... Putting the matter in a slightly different 
way, the First Amendment could be regarded as giving forum non 
conveniens special dimensions and constitutional stature in actions 
for defamation against publishers and broadcasters.19 
Buckley thus acknowledged that the first amendment is effective 
against the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, 20 and that 
16. 383 F.2d at 590 
17. Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper 
Libel Cases, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 436 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over 
Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 Coum. L. REv. 342 (1967); Note, Exercise 
of Jurisdiction Over a Newspaper Vacated on the Basis of the Fifth Amendment, 35 
FORDHAM L. REv. 726 (1967); Comment, Due Process and First Amendment Considera-
tions in Libel Cases, 52 IowA L. REv. 1034 (1967); Recent Case, Foreign Publishing 
Corporation Subject to Suit in Connecticut for Libel; in Personam Jurisdiction Over 
News Media Held Governed by First Amendment Considerations of Parties' and 
Public's Interests and Not by That Amendment's Application to "Minimum Contacts" 
Requirement of Due Process Clause, 4 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 347 (1967); Recent Case, First 
Amendment Requires a Greater Showing of Contact in a Libel Action To Satisfy Due 
Process Than Is Necessary in other Types of Actions, 20 VAND. L. REv. 921 (1967). 
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
19. 373 F.2d at 183. 
20. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ("The fundamental concept of 
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed 
by the First Amendment."). 
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thus applied the first amendment has a proper role in determining 
the place of trial. Only the characterization of this role as "jurisdic-
tional" is rejected. In other words, the first amendment does not 
prevent the existence of jurisdiction in a given state, but it may pre-
vent the exercise of that jurisdiction. Such a metaphysical distinction 
has the advantage of preserving the exclusive status of "fairness" as 
the standard for jurisdiction, but it poses a difficult question: what 
exactly is "jurisdiction" that cannot be constitutionally exercised? 
If the result reached in the Connor case is a desirable one, it 
would seem more candid to accept the theory behind it as an excep-
tion to the strict test of "fairness" which is generally applied than 
to force the theory into a less innovative guise. 
B. Fairness to the Plaintiff 
The Connor rule has been assailed as being unfair to the libel 
plaintiff in at least two ways. First, it is said, Connor denies the libel 
plaintiff his traditional right to have his injury measured by a jury 
familiar with the standards of the community in which the loss was 
suffered (usually, of course, the plaintiff's domicile if it was one of 
the places of publication).21 This "right," however, is far from tra-
ditional. Before 1961 Alabama had no long-arm statute whereby its 
courts might have asserted jurisdiction over the New York Times.22 
Jnqeed, before 1955 no state had a statute that would have permitted 
jurisdiction on the basis of newspapers mailed into a state.23 But 
apart from the recent origins of any broad right to a trial before 
jurors from the plaintiff's community, there are other reasons to 
doubt the wisdom of allowing local evaluation of the plaintiff's in-
juries. While a local jury may be in the best position to gauge such 
imponderable injuries as the plaintiff's loss of standing in the com-
munity, the same jury is most likely to fall prey to local prejudices. 
The $500,000 verdicts awarded in Walker v. Savell24 and New 
York Times v. Sullivan,25 verdicts which survived all the way to the 
Supreme Court, should serve as warnings that local understanding is 
sometimes inseparable from local prejudice. 
21, Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publi$hers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 
67 CoLuM, L. REv. 342, 363 (1967). 
22. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199(1) (1960). This statute was interpreted not to permit 
jurisdiction over the New York Times in New York Times Co. v. Connor, 291 F.2d 
492 (5th Cir. 1961), but the decision in New York Times Co. v, Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 
144 S.2d 25 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), specifically disapproved 
the federal court's ruling. On a second appeal, Connor v. New York Times Co., 310 
F~d 133 (5th Ch'. 1962), the earlier order of the federal court was vacated and the 
case was remanded for trial. The case under discussion in this Note is the appeal taken 
from that trial. 
23. The first of the general long-arm statutes was that of Illinois. Civil Practice 
Act, art. III, § 6, [1955] Ill. Laws 69th Gen. Assembly 2245-46, 
24, 393 S.W .2d 671 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1965). 
25. 273 Ala. 656, 144 S.2d 25 (1962). 
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The second way in which the Connot rule has been said to be 
unfair to the libel plaintiff is its effect of forcing him to assume the 
expenses and inconveniences of litigation far from home.26 This argu-
ment must be considered, however, in various settings. Clearly, the 
well-to-do plaintiff with a meritorious claim should not be seriously 
discouraged by the costs of litigating in the defendant's forum. The 
unfairness that he experiences is no greater than the unfairness that 
the defendant would suffer from litigation in an inconvenient forum. 
The well-to-do plaintiff with a worthless or marginal claim, on the 
other hand, will be discouraged because his expected recovery will 
not justify the expenses of a distant trial. Such a result, however, 
cannot be called unfair. Worthless or marginal claims should not be 
encouraged at the expense of the free circulation of opinion and 
information. The more difficult case is that of the impecunious plain-
tiff with a meritorious, but modest claim. He indeed may be treated 
unfairly by a rule which makes an otherwise worthwhile claim im-
practical to pursue. There is some comfort in the fact that such 
plaintiffs are less likely to be in the news, and hence less likely to 
be libeled in the national press. But when such plaintiffs appear, 
courts faced with the Connor precedent will have to make the hard 
choice between creating an exception to the rule27 and having uni-
formity with an occasional unfair result.28 
Moreover, strong policy reasons seem to outweigh many questions 
of unfairness, as New York Times v. Sullivan demonstrates. There 
the Supreme Court decided that the first amendment dictated a com-
plete denial of remedy to the public official who cannot prove malice 
in a libel action.20 Thus the Connor rule, the general effect of which 
26. Comment, supra note 21, at 362. 
27. More lenient treatment for the impecunious plaintiff need not be deemed an 
"exception" to the rule if it is recalled that the Connor rule was presented as a 
"balancing" test. The Connor court merely required a greater showing of contact in 
cases involving freedom of the press; it did not establish first amendment considera-
tions as the only relevant determinants of jurisdiction. Thus it might be argued that 
the economic position of the impecunious plaintiff is simply another factor to be 
considered. The opinion in Fourth N.W. Nat'! Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 
Minn. 110, 114-16, 117 N.W.2d 732, 734-36 (1961), appears to have had this principle 
in mind in distinguishing between individual and corporate defendants. The economic 
means of the parties also seems to underlie the "multistate activity" approach to the 
jurisdictional decision suggested by von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1167-73 (1966). The cost of 
including the economic means factor, however, is the further complication intro-
duces into pretrial procedure. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text. 
28. Discussion of the fine points of fairness tends to obscure a fact apparently 
ignored by some of the Connor critics, viz., present jurisdictional law is not concerned 
with a fine balance of fairness. For example, one finds little discussion of mere 
inconvenience to the defendant who must defend himself far from home or chief place 
of business. For him the jurisdictional question is not whether suit in the plaintiff's 
forum is merely unfair, but whether it is "so unfair to the defendant as to amount to 
a denial of due process." Cun-ie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of 
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 557 (1963). 
29. 376 U.S. at 283 (1964). 
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is merely to increase the plaintiff's burden in pursuing his remedy, 
is far more fair than the remedy-denying rule that the Sullivan deci-
sion found to be required by the first amendment. 
C. The Need for Special Protection for Publishers in 
Interstate Defamation Cases 
In the Buckley opinion, Judge Friendly observed: 
Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting companies are businesses 
conducted for profit and often make very large ones ... [T]hey must 
pay the freight; and injured persons should not be relegated to 
forums so distant as to make collection of their claims difficult or 
impossible unless strong policy considerations demand.30 
Thus the profit motive of the publishing business is made to appear 
a reason for avoiding special jurisdictional rules for publishers. Yet 
it is precisely this profit motive that gave rise to the Connor rule. 
Any profits derived from a state with which the publisher has only 
minimum contacts may be outweighed by the extra costs of litigating 
in that state or by excessive verdicts handed down by biased juries 
in that state.31 A publisher faced with increased litigational costs,32 
or with the possibility that some excessive verdicts will survive ap-
peal, 33 must make a rational economic response. As the Connor court 
put it: "In the face of this very real risk, could a publisher justify 
distribution of his product in any state where the size of his circu-
lation does not balance the danger of his liability?"34 
True, the publisher contemplating termination of distribution 
in high-risk states has an alternative. Rather than abandon whatever 
income he may derive from these states, he may find it more attrac-
tive to exclude, or at least modify, potentially libelous articles. While 
libel laws are designed in part to deter the publication of true libels, 
such deterrence should not be geared to the standards of the most 
sensitive plaintiff or the most inflammable jury. Yet the added cost 
30. 373 F.2d at 182. 
31. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra. 
32. Increased litigation costs may not be a substantial tbreat to the publisher 
already defending a $500,000 law suit, but tbey will always assure the merely vexa-
tious libel plaintiff tbat he can harass tbe large out-of-state newspaper for tbe small 
cost of filing within his own state. Under the Connor rule the defendant will still 
have to bear the costs involved with raising the Connor defense itself, but he will be 
able to avoid tbe otherwise inevitable costs of importing witnesses from his place of 
publication in order to settle, for example, the factual question of malicious intent 
raised by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 
33. If a jury is instructed properly as to the rule in New York Times v. Sullivan con• 
cerning actual malice, prejudice can still influence it to make a finding of malice. 
When tbe evidence is sufficient to support (but not compel) a finding of malice, tbe 
judge and courts of appeal will not be able to discover the true basis for the jury's 
decision merely by inspecting the evidence. 
34. 365 F.2d at 572. 
January 1968] Notes 549 
of defending even a worthless libel claim in a foreign forum may 
have the in terrorem effect of causing the publisher to avoid contro-
versial or highly sensitive articles.35 In such a situation, the impact 
on free speech is direct. Furthermore, the publisher's entire reader-
ship is affected, not merely the handful that would be affected by 
the termination of subscriptions in high-risk states. 
The total effect of a publisher's cutting off distribution in a given 
state or modifying what he would otherwise have printed is by na-
ture incapable of precise measurement or evaluation. The faith which 
the Connor court placed in the importance of the press, however, is 
in accord with general legal principles,36 and in particular with the 
Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of widespread public 
debate in cases like New York Times v. Sullivan.31 
D. The Sufficiency of the Sullivan Rule 
The doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan, requiring a public 
official to demonstrate actual malice before recovering in an action 
for libel, has been advanced as a protection for the press sufficient 
to accomplish the goals of the Connor court.38 While the beneficial 
effects of Sullivan cannot be doubted, it has not solved all the related 
problems in need of solution. For example, Sullivan places no limit 
on the size of the verdict in a defamation case. By removing the trial 
from a place of likely prejudice, Connor (and Buckley as well) makes 
an excessive verdict improbable. Moreover, Sullivan is concerned 
with the status of the plaintiff, not the possibly inflammatory nature 
35. Certain publications, especially those whose reputation is built on complete 
coverage of the news, may not be easy prey to the temptation to avoid the risk of 
controversy. Not all publications, however, have such a powerful incentive or the 
economic means to resist such temptation. 
ll6. At common law a defamation would not be enjoined unless incident to another 
tort. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 755 (1964). This was true even though the plaintiff might 
thereby be denied any hope of complete relief. (Injunctions are granted, in general, 
only when legal relief is inadequate. Thus, in the situation which would have called 
for an injunction because legal relief is inadequate, under the special defamation rule 
injunctive relief is denied.) 
37. 376 U.S. at 269-83 (1964). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Near 
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statutes which permit injunctions 
against defamatory publications are unconstitutional). 
llS. Comment, supra note 21, at 358-59. It could be argued, of course, that any 
suit against an out-of-state publisher is capable of having a "chilling effect" on freedom 
of the press, but few cases are as amenable as libel cases to a direct appeal to regional 
prejudice. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 701, 7ll0-31 (1965) (dissenting 
opinion), afj'd 388 U.S. 130 (1967), quoting some remarks made by the plaintiff's 
lawyer to the jury: 
I say, Gentlemen, this is the time we have got to get them. A hundred million 
dollars in advertising, would ten percent of that be fair to ·wallace Butts for what 
they have done to him? Would a fifty cent assessment on each of the twenty-three 
million issues which they wrote about him there, would that be a strain or a 
burden on them? I think it would teach them that we don't have that kind of 
journalism down here, and we don't want it down here [Georgia], and we don't 
want it to spread from 666 Fifth Avenue any further than that building right now. 
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of the alleged libel. Thus, if a newspaper feature should negligently 
include the name of a relatively unknown person, not a public of-
ficial, in its account of a racial disturbance, and if the account should 
cast this person in an unfavorable light, the possibility of jury preju• 
dice against the newspaper in a subsequent libel case would be just 
as strong as in the Sullivan case, but the Sullivan principle would not 
apply because the plaintiff was not a public official. 
Finally, the Sullivan rule does not protect the out-of-state pub-
lisher from the costs of defending himself against frequent worthless 
or marginal claims. The Connor case itself was one in which the 
plaintiff's evidence was ultimately deemed insufficient,30 but only 
after three appearances in the federal district court and three in the 
court of appeals. Had the Connor rule been available from the first, 
these costs might have been avoided. 
There will, of course, be some preliminary inconvenience in 
deciding the jurisdictional issues. This problem may be minimized, 
however, by the deterrent effect that the Connor rule should have 
on a plaintiff who contemplates bringing suit in the wrong forum. 
Moreover, an effort can be made to simplify the procedure for resolv-
ing the question of jurisdiction. Unless there is a genuine dispute as 
to jurisdictional facts, affidavits should be sufficient to settle the 
question. 40 If there is such a genuine dispute, the use of a prelim-
inary hearing, hopefully neither long nor complicated, should ordi-
narily suffice to answer jurisdictional questions before a trial on the 
merits becomes necessary.41 Even if a trial appears to be the only 
means adequately to resolve jurisdictional questions, a separate trial 
for those questions should be considered.42 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE CONNOR RULE 
Both the Second and the Fifth Circuits have recognized the role 
of the first amendment in determining the place of trial for a libel 
suit between plaintiffs and defendant-publishers from different states. 
Connor cast the issue in terms of jurisdiction, Buckley in terms of 
forum non conveniens. The Buckley court believed its approach to 
have the following advantage: 
[It] has the n1erit of focusing attention on the facts allegedly creating 
hardship in each case without mandating a uniform rule that would 
39. 36!> F.2d at '573-77. 
40. This approach was taken in Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 38 
F.R.D. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where the sole jurisdictional question was also the central 
issue to be litigated: whether or not defendant had committed a tort within the state. 
41. Id. (suggesting the possibility of a pretrial hearing should the affidavit approach 
fail); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
42. FED. R. CIV, P. 42(b) provides that: "The court, in furtherance of convenience 
or to avoid prejudic_e ..• may,,order a separate trial ... of any separate issue or of 
any number of •.. issues .•.. 
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apply whether the place to which the newsp;i.per is summoned to 
defend a libel suit is twenty-five or twenty-five hundred miles from 
the point of publication, as a jurisdictional due process approach 
that necessarily focuses at least in part on state boundaries might 
well do.43 
It thus appears that the Buckley court did not perceive the essence 
of the Connor rule: the publisher's circulation must "balance the 
danger of ... liability," that is, his revenue from circulation within 
the state must bear some reasonable relation to what he might lose 
from law suits arising out of that circulation. Such a balancing must 
necessarily focus attention "on the facts allegedly creating the hard-
ship in each case." The decision of the Golino case by the Fifth 
Circuit should serve to dispel any doubts about the flexibility of the 
Connor rule, for in Golino the court found the facts to be such that 
upholding jurisdiction would "in no way inhibit the zeal with which 
Curtis distributes its ideas."44 
Application of the Connor principle to the facts in Buckley should 
further illustrate the flexible nature of the jurisdictional approach. 
The Buckley court specifically found no danger of regional prejudice 
against the defendant, and it further noted that New York City, the 
headquarters of the defendant, was only forty miles from the place 
in which suit had originally been brought. Thus, under the balanc-
ing test of Connor, Connecticut should be permitted to exercise 
jurisdiction. The exercise of jurisdiction would put the defendant 
to no serious inconvenience, no danger of prejudice, and no extra-
ordinary expense of litigation, and consequently he would have no 
incentive to limit either his circulation or his expression. 
A hypothetical application of the Buckley rule of forum non 
conveniens to the facts of the Connor case is more difficult. Since 
Buckley ruled, on the facts of the case, that the place where suit was 
brought was the proper place for trial, the rule suggested in Buckley 
is still mere dictum that has not yet been tested in action. One of 
the difficulties yet to be faced is clarifying the meaning of the "con-
stitutional stature" that Buckley would give to its forum non con-
veniens rule.45 It is hoped that "constitutional stature" includes the 
right to appellate court review of rulings by the trial court on forum 
non conveniens motions. Ordinarily, denial of a motion of forum 
non conveniens would not merit such treatment, since the incon-
venience that granting the motion is intended to avoid would already 
have occurred by the time an appeal could be taken.46 However, in 
43. 373 F.2d at 183. 
44. 383 F.2d at 592. 
45. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
46. See w. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, I FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 433-40 (C. 
Wright ed. 1960). The same reasoning applies to Davis v. Farmers' Co-Operative Equity 
Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923), invoked by the Buckley court in favor of its forum non con-
552 1v.f ichigan Law Review 
the context of an interstate libel case review is meaningful for two 
reasons: (I) the effects of likely jury prejudice can be cured best by 
a reversal with a direction to dismiss,47 the new trial, if there is one, 
taking place elsewhere, most likely in the publisher's state;48 (2) ap-
pellate supervision of the application of the first amendment prin-
ciples is desirable, since consistency, especially with respect to 
important constitutional questions, usually depends upon the availa-
bility of such supervision. Doctrinal simplicity argues for characteriz-
ing the first amendment's role in determining the place of trial as 
jurisdictional, since questions of jurisdiction need no exceptional 
treatment to be appealable. 
The question of characterization is, of course, of little importance 
if the essential features are the same. Thus far, the differences be-
nveen the approaches of the Fifth and Second Circuits lie chiefly in 
rhetoric; no court has yet demonstrated that one rule must yield 
results different from those of the other. It is important that courts 
considering long-arm libel cases in the future not create differences 
where none yet exist. Connor must not be interpreted as an invita-
tion to a numbers game wherein circulation figures are compared 
with a magical minimum. The forum non conveniens of Buckley 
must be given its "constitutional stature." Above all, superficial dif-
ferences between the two cases must not be used to undermine the 
principle on which they agree: the first amendment has a proper 
role in determining the place of trial in interstate defamation cases. 
veniens approach. Davis held that a state court could not exercise jurisdiction over an 
interstate carrier when trial in that state would impose an undue burden upon inter-
state commerce. McGowan, in Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 33 ILL. 
L. REv. 875, 889-90 (1939), made the same point suggested here: that the forum non 
conveniens approach was unsatisfactory because, under most circumstances, review 
would not be possible until the harm of the inconvenient litigation was almost 
complete. 
47. See note 33 supra concerning the difficulties of judicial control over prejudice. 
If reversal is not accompanied by dismissal-i.e., if a new trial is allowed in the same 
location-the effects of prejudice would have no reason to be weaker on the second 
round. 
48. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966), which held 
that a state must have not only minimum contacts with a case, but a sufficient 
interest in the case to sustain constitutional jurisdiction, tends to indicate that in 
most cases the plaintiff's home state or the defendant's home state will be the only 
acceptable forums. 
